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This paper explores the idea to regulate retailing industry through a
tax on the store parking size. In Western economies, retailers use common
resources (land use, road networks) contributing to the store accessibility
that they do not pay for. This kind of free riding gives gross merchandisers
and hypermakets a competitive advantage which establishes undue market
power while creating, presumably, ineﬃciencies when social cost is taken
into account. Hence the idea to tax the parking, which is a proxy measure of
the accessibility resources used by the retailer. By using a standard model
of horizontal diﬀerentiation, we explore the impact of parking taxation in
a monopoly and in duopoly and we characterize optimal taxation policies
Keywords : spatial competition, optimal taxation, parking
JEL classiﬁcation : L13, H20, H40, R10.1. Introduction
For many decades, retailing industry is hugely expanding in Western countries
[2]. Most of the cities in Europe and in North America are now surrounded by
hypermarkets and hypercenters attracting each day crowds of customers. Some
European countries worried about this concentration wave in retailing industry ;
they decided to introduce speciﬁc regulations rules so as to control indirectly or
directly the supermarket expansion. The most common way is to restrict opening
hours except for shops in sparsely populated areas and retail units like bakeries,
ﬂorists, kiosks, etc..for instance in Germany and Finland ; but an expansion of
store hours is an indirect means for supermarkets/mass merchandisers to sustain
growth, as small, general merchandise retailers are likely going to suﬀer (cf. [4]).
An extreme case is France where in 1974 and 1996, under the pressure of shop-
keepers lobbies, the government put legal restrictions on the size of new stores (loi
Royer and loi Raﬀarin) ; exceptions to these rules are decided by local commit-
tees whose members are a mix of shopkeeper representatives, civil servants and
politicians. The lack of economic guidelines and the bribe practices made such a
control system quite permissive. In addition, such a regulation amounts to deter
entry of potential competitors so that the incumbent retailers gained a decisive
advantage. Finally, the mass merchandisers were not the last to adopt creative
compliance practices to bypass the rules. As a result, this regulation system is
poorly founded and ineﬃcient. Clearly, ﬂoor space is not an exact measure of
market power.
It can be argued that, in market economies, conventional antitrust policies
should be suﬃcient to regulate retailing industry. Of course, this is true for
supplier-retailer relationships and dominant positions problems. But these poli-
cies are not suitable to cope with public good issues. Clearly, in industrialized
countries, mass merchandisers beneﬁt from externalities which are underestimated
or neglected by the regulator.In addition, they generate road traﬃc and congestion
which account for negative externalities. Undoubtedly these externalities are a key
factor explaining the huge development of the retailing industry and consequently
their market power.
Where do these externalities come from ? Historically, it is well known that
any retailing system is related to a speciﬁc transportation mode, for the suppliers
as well as for the customers. At the end of the 19th century, for instance, the
expansion of big department stores in London, Paris or New York is due to the
technology of the lifts and elevators. Since the ﬁfties, hypermarket growth results
from the overwhelming use of individual car, the building of highway networks
linking the cities, amenable both for customer cars and supplier trucks. Hence, a
key factor explaining the growth of hypermarkets is undoubtedly the improvement
2of accessibility. Accessibility comes from public investment, it can be considered
as a public good for which the retailers do not pay the full price since roads
are mostly paid by the taxpayer. This free rider behavior is quite explicit when
retailers choose their location. It must be said however that accessibility can
n o tb ee x a c t l ym e a s u r e da n dt h a ti ti sap u b l i cg o o du s e df o rab r o a dr a n g eo f
economic purposes which cannot be isolated from the shopping decisions. But
the part of accessibility which is speciﬁcally used in shopping activities is strongly
related to the parking size of the store, which is clearly a complementary resource
of (public) accessibility. Accordingly, parking size may be considered as a tax
basis to cover externalities induced by accessibility.
In this paper, we argue that retailers should be taxed on the store parking
size as an indirect means to make them to pay for the use of accessibility. This
paper is aimed at exploring this idea and also at discussing optimal taxation
issues in the imperfect competition context of retailing. For this purpose, we
use a standard model of horizontal diﬀerentiation [5], [8] where consumers of a
standard basket of goods are distributed uniformly along a road represented by
interval [0,1]. The travel cost incurred by the customer is here the sum of a
cost depending on the distance to the store, as usual, and a cost depending on
accessibility. Accessibility is measured by the parking size installed by the retailer
and then generates an investment/operating cost incurred by the retailer. Then
accessibility operates both at the demand and the supply sides. But it also induces
a social cost proportional to the parking size a part of which is paid by the retailer
through a tax rate1.
Section 2 is devoted to the monopoly case where an unique retailer is located
at point 0. In this context, we prove that taxation is detrimental to the retailer
but also to the consumers when they do not contribute to the remaining part of
the social cost. When they do, we ﬁnd a taxation rule among the consumers where
the taxpayers are only those who buy the good ; this taxation rule is neutral in
the sense that it does not aﬀect the demand function. Optimal taxation is then
s t u d i e da n dy i e l d sat a xr a t ew h i c hc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e di nt e r m so fL i n d a h lp r i c e s .
In section 3, these results are extended to the duopoly case when two identical
retailers are located at points 0 and 1. Discussion is organized in terms of two
key parameters : the travel cost per unit of length, which is inversely related
to consumer mobility, and the unit social cost, which measures the environmen-
tal impact of accessibility. The latter is then related to the urbanization rate of
the area. According to the values of these parameters, prevailing market struc-
tures (local monopolies, exclusive territories, duopoly), parking sizes and optimal
taxation rates are derived. Two main results are found :
1Commodity taxation in vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiated duopoly are respectively anal-
ysed in [3],[6].
3• Taxation generates market imperfections ; by decreasing parking sizes and
retailing areas, taxation stimulates the prevalence of local monopolies and
exclusive territories.
• In highly urbanized environments, optimal parking tax rate do not depend
on the market structure. But in weakly urbanized environments, local mo-
nopolies should face a lower tax rate. In real world, this suggests that re-
tailing regulation by taxation has to be designed consistently with the com-
petitiveness of the sector.
2. Retailing monopoly and parking taxation
Let us consider a store with a parking of size a. We assume that variable a is a
proxy measure of all factors under the control of the retailer facilitating access to
the customers, contributing for instance to ”one-stop shopping”2.
Let us consider a ”market”, namely a set of consumers likely to buy one unit
of a standard basket of goods, uniformly distributed on interval [0,1] ; in interval
[y,y + dy] there are Ndy consumers, so that N stands for the potential size of
the market. We assume all the consumers have the same valuation of the good,
w. The retailer, is located at point 0, charges a price p. Let t the travel cost per
unit of length of the consumers, with w ≤ t. We assume that any consumer incurs
a( p e r c e i v e d )ﬁxed cost of transport G(a) to join the store ; this cost negatively
depends on the store access, i.e. on the parking size, namely, G0 ≤ 0. Travel cost
f o rc o n s u m e rl o c a t e da tp o i n ty is G(a)+ty. He/she will buy the good if :
p + G(a)+ty ≤ w,
Then the surplus (indirect utility) gained by consumer y is [w − (p + G(a)+ty)]
+
.T h eretail area is deﬁned by the set [0,u] of consumers who buy the good, with
u =( w − p − G(a))/t, so that the demand to the retailer is :
D(p,a)=N (w − p − G(a))/t, (2.1)









2When a =0 ,we consider that the store still works with on-street parking and walking
customers
42.1. Monopoly pricing and parking size
Let c<pthe purchase and delivery cost of a standard basket of goods sold
by the retailer. Let C(a) the building/operating cost of the parking. Parking
is actually a true technology encompassing various operations including space
arrangement (cf.[1]), maintenance, security and shopping cards management. We
postulate that parking technology faces decreasing returns to scale, i.e. C0 > 0 et
C00 ≥ 0,since dedicated resources are needed when the parking size becomes large.
Accordingly the proﬁt of the retailer can be written as :
P =( p − c)D(p,a) − C(a) (2.3)
In the following, we postulate that ﬁxed travel cost is linear, i.e. G(a)=σ − ga.
Parameter g ≥ 0 measures the eﬃciency of the parking system. Then :
D(p,a)) = N (v − p + ga)/t (2.4)
with v = w − σ is termed the (net) reservation price for the good, with v>c .
We assume that the parking cost is a quadratic function, C = αa2/2. Hence :
P (p,a)=( p − c)N (v − p + ga)/t − αa
2/2), (2.5)
and the consumer surplus becomes given by (2.2) is S(p,a)=




maximizing P with respect to a,p yields optimal price, parking size and quantity
given by :
pm =
αt(c + v) − Ng2c





















2. Of course, when g =0 , the classical
formulas are found with monopoly price p0 =( c + v)/2 ≤ pm and the proﬁta n d
surplus P0 =
N(v−c)2
4t ,S 0 =
N(v−c)2
8t , with the parking size equal to zero.
5Proposition 2.1. Under condition (2.6), in creasing the eﬃciency of the parking















Thus any eﬀo r tt oi m p r o v et h ee ﬃciency of the parking is Pareto-improving
for the consumers and the retailer. The price increase is more than compensated
by the increase of the parking size.
2.2. Second best pricing and parking sizing
It is easy to prove that the socially optimal price and parking size which maximize
the social welfare W = S + P is p = c, a =
Ng(v − c)
αt − Ng2 ,for which the proﬁti s
negative. Accordingly, we have to consider the second best optimum, deﬁned as






Standard computations give price and parking size values given by : psb =
c +
Ng2 (v − c)
2αt − Ng2 ,a sb =
2Ng(v − c)
2αt − Ng2 , with asb >a mand psb ≤ pm if g ≤
p
tα/N,if
not. It is then socially desirable to have larger parking. The price is lower than
in the monopoly case except for strongly eﬃcient parking (i.e. for
p
αt/N ≤ g ≤ p
2αt/N) where the price is higher.
2.3. Social cost and parking taxation
The previous results hold since the social cost of accessibility is not taken into
consideration. The social cost eventually includes negative externalities on the
environment generated by the road traﬃc around the store. We assume that the
social cost is proportional to the parking size, of the form θa, with θ > 0. It is
convenient to interpret unit cost θ as a measure of the urbanization rate of the
area. The social cost is shared among the parties. A part is paid by the retailer
through a tax on a at rate s ≤ θ. The after tax proﬁti sΠ = P−sa. The remaining
part, (θ − s)a, is covered by the consumers.
62.3.1. Taxation rules for the consumers
How could the remaining part (θ − s)a be charged among the consumers ? This
can be done through individual taxation policies implemented by a regulator ;
however these polices can induce distortions on the demand and modify the retail
area of the store. In our context, four taxation policies may be considered by
combining the following features :
(i) the basis of taxation, consumers vs buyers,
(ii) the uniformity in terms of location.
T h r e ep o l i c i e sd e s e r v ec o n s i d e r a t i o n:
1. Uniform taxation, consumer based : Each consumer in the economy - buyer
or not - is taxed an amount equal to (θ − s)a/N ;t h i sc a s ed e a l sw i t han e t
global surplus function Σ = S − (θ − s)a and the retail area remains equal
to (v + ga− p)/t ; the demand is then unaﬀected by the social cost.
2. Uniform taxation, buyer based. This is the case where a toll l is paid at the
entrance of the parking. Toll l is deﬁned by N
R v−p+ga−l
t




(v + ga− p) −
q¡
(v + ga− p)
2 − 4(θ − s)at/N
¢¶
. A n dt h e nt h e
retail area is
µq¡
(v + ga− p)
2 − 4(θ − s)at/N
¢
+( v + ga− p)
¶
/2t,which
depends on unit social cost θ. Obviously, it converges to the neutral case
when N →∞ .
3. Non-uniform taxation, buyer based. Only the customers are taxed. The
tax payed by the individual located at distance y is assumed to be a linear
and decreasing function of y on the form f − hy ; the farther the cus-
tomer is located, the less he is taxed. Accordingly, the retail area is then
v−p+ga−f
t−h . Coeﬃcients f and h are determined by conditions ensuring that
(i) the sum of the contributions equals the social cost (θ − s)a, (ii) the
pivotal customer, who is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying, is not












Solving system (2.9) yield :
h =
2(θ − s)at2
N (v + ga− p)
2,f=
2(θ − s)t
N (v + ga− p)
.
7It can be checked that the retail area is still equal to (v + ga− p)/t and
then demand is unaﬀected by the social cost so that, as in policy 1, a net
global surplus function Σ = S−(θ − s)a can be unambiguously considered.
Policies 1 and 3 are neutral in terms of consumer preferences as the demand
function is not distorted by the social cost while policy 2 is not. In the following,
we assume that only policies 1 and 3 are used by the regulator. Notice that, for
policy 3, the regulator needs a full information on the location of the consumers.
2.3.2. Monopoly pricing under parking taxation
Solving program maxp,a≥0 Π, for any value of the tax rate, yields the monopoly





Proposition 2.2. for s ≤ ˆ s, the monopoly solution is given by :
• The price and parking size are : p∗ (s)=
αt(c + v) − Ng2c − gst
2αt − Ng2 ,a ∗ (s)=
a =
Ng(v − c) − 2st
2αt − Ng2 .
• The quantity sold is q∗(s)=N
α(v−c)−gs
2αt−Ng2 .




• The consumer surplus is given by S∗ (s)=S = 1
2




For s>s , one has :
• p∗ = p0,
• a∗ =0 .
Proof. immediate
Corollary 2.3. • The price and the parking size are decreasing functions of
rate s.
8• T h ed e m a n di sd e c r e a s i n g .
• The surplus and the proﬁt are decreasing,
• The net proﬁt Π∗ (s)=P∗ (s)−sa∗ is decreasing and the net surplus Σ∗(s)=
S∗ (s) − (θ − s)a∗ is increasing
Proof. immediate
Hence taxing the parking size of the retailer reduces the parking size of the
store but decreases the price charged by the retailer in order to attract more
consumers. Because of the monopoly power exerted by the retailer, the tax is
not neutral from the customer point of view : the parking reduction induces a
shrinking of the retail area since the inframarginal customers will be deterred from
shopping at the store. To dampen this phenomenon, the retailer has to decrease
his price but this is insuﬃcient, in terms of individual surplus, to oﬀset the parking
size decrease.
2.3.3. Optimal parking taxation
The regulator has to decide the tax rate s which maximizes the net social welfare
Ω∗ (s)=P∗ (s)+S∗ (s) − θa∗ (s). In this subsection, we assume that the social
cost is low, namely :




,S o l u t i o ni s: ½
s =











Let s∗∗ =a r gm a xΩ∗ (s). Straightforward computations give :
s
∗∗ =
2θ(2αt − Ng2) − Ngα(v − c)
4αt − 3Ng2 ≤ θ. (2.14)
s




2gθ + αv − αc
θα
(2.15)
Under condition (2.13), s∗∗ ≤ ˆ s. It follows that the price, parking size and
quantity are given by :
p
∗∗ =
2αt(c + v) − 3Ng2c − 2tθg
4αt − 3Ng2 , (2.16)
9a
∗∗ =
3Ng(v − c) − 4tθ
4αt − 3Ng2 . (2.17)
These values of price and parking size can be directly achieved by the social
planner, provided that the monopoly power of the retailer is preserved. The latter




+ D(p)=0 , (2.18)











Let us consider that the regulator seeks to maximize the net social welfare
under monopoly pricing condition (2.18). For this purpose, using relation (2.19),
l e tu se x p r e s sa l lt h ev a r i a b l e sa sf u n c t i o n so fa : ˜ S (a)=S(h(a),a), ˜ P (a)=




It can be proved that the solution of program (2.20) is a∗∗. In other words, optimal
tax rate s∗∗ leads to the socially best value of the parking size of the store (and
the price) preserving the price-maker behavior of the retailer.
2.3.4. Interpretation in terms of Lindahl prices under imperfect com-
petition
Rates s∗∗ and (θ − s∗∗) can be interpreted as Lindhal prices [7] of the parking
size conceived as a public good, ensuring the achievement of the social optimum
a∗∗(cf. Appendix 1) . This is made in a decentralized way, from the point of view
















In program (2.21), the tax rate is exactly chosen so that the optimal parking
size from the point of view of the retailer coincides with the socially optimal size.
In the similar way, program (2.22) can be interpreted as follows : let us imagine
that a public agency, in charge of the only interests of the consumers/taxpayers,
is responsible for building the parking incurring a cost of (θ − s∗∗)a. This agency
would ﬁx the parking size exactly at the socially desirable level.
103. Retailing duopoly competition and parking taxation
Let us assume that the market is served by a spatially diﬀerentiated duopoly of
identical retailers. Retailer 1 is located at point 0 and retailer 2 at point 1.L e t
pi,a i the price and the parking size of ﬁrm i. Di stands for the demand to ﬁrm i.
With a tax rate s,the after tax proﬁto fﬁrm i is Πi =( pi − c)Di−αa2
i/2−sai. Let
Si the surplus gained by the consumers of ﬁrm i. T h es o c i a lc o s ti sθ(a1 + a2). As
in the monopoly case, we assume that the regulator has to ﬁxt h et a xr a t eo n
the parking sizes. We will discuss the impact of taxation in terms of mobility and
urbanization rate.
3.1. Parking taxation
F i r s to fa l l ,l e tu sa s s u m et h a tt a xr a t es is ﬁxed ; it is identical for both retailers
who are involved in a spatial duopoly where each of them has to ﬁx the parking size
and the price. The analysis is restricted to symmetric equilibria of the duopoly.
The Nash conditions are derived in Appendix 2. According to the values of travel
cost t, three types of market structures may arise :
• High consumer mobility,f o rt ≤ 2
h




/3, the retailers are
involved in a diﬀerentiated duopoly competition. All the customers buy the
good, the market shares are 1/2,1/2. The parking sizes depend on the tax
rate but the price does not..
• Medium consumer mobility:for 2
h




/3 <t≤ v − c +
g(gN−2θ)
2α , t h er e t a i l e r sa c to na nexclusive territory b a s i so nh a l fo ft h em a r k e t
: this means that the median customer, located at point 1/2 is exactly
indiﬀerent between the three following alternatives : to buy to retailer 1, to
buy to retailer 2, not to buy. The price and the parking size depends on the
tax rate.






retailers are local monopolies,t h e yi m p l e m e n tp a r k i n g( ai > 0). There is no
full coverage of the market. Customers located around the middle do not
buy. The price and the parking sizes depend on the tax rate.
• Very low consumer mobility, for1
2
v−c
s gN ≤ t, the retailers are local
monopolies, they do not implement parking (ai =0 ) .T h e p r i c e d o e s n o t
depend on the tax rate.
T h er e s u l t s( f o rs ≤ gN/2) are summarized in table 3.1.
11range of t price parking size
t ≤ 2
h













/3 <t≤ v − c +
g(gN−2s)


















s gN ≤ t v+c
2 0
Table 3.1: Mobility and taxation
As expected, the higher is the travel cost t,the less competitive is the retailing
industry. In this context, taxation results in two related eﬀects :
1. Taxation decreases the parking sizes in any situation and then hurts the
consumers, as in the monopoly case. For medium and low consumer mo-
bility, this is compensated by a price decrease which restores a part of the
consumer surplus loss. For high and very low consumer mobility, parking
tax does not aﬀect the price.
2. More importantly, taxation has an impact on the market structure : table
1 indicates that the threshold values determining the various cases shift to
the left when rate s increases. Hence, there are values of travel cost t for
which duopolists become exclusive territory retailers, and exclusive territory
retailers become local monopolies. Accordingly, taxation generates market
imperfection : Reducing the parking sizes through taxation strengthens local
market power of the retailers.
3.2. Optimal taxation
Of course, at the global level, taxation is made to cover social cost. The above
mentioned eﬀects interact in determining the optimal tax rate. Let us examine
now what it happens when tax rate is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare.
Computations are derived in Appendix 3. Three situations may arise according
to the unit social cost value.
3.2.1. Low urbanization, θ ≤ 3Ng/4
Table (3.2) indicates the optimal value of tax rate and the related parking sizes
a c c o r d i n gt oc o s tt. Let ˜ t = v − c +
g(gN−2θ)
2α ,the value at which local monopoly
prevails. ˜ t will be termed the turning point of the industry.
12range of t tax rate parking sizes
t<2
h
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v − c +
g(3Ng−4θ)














Evolution of the optimal tax rate in terms of travel cost is given in ﬁgure(3.1).
These results indicate that the optimal tax rate globally decreases with consumer
mobility. Except at the turning point where the tax rate suddenly jumps. Anyway
tax is lower in the local monopoly case than in the duopoly.
In terms of policy implication, consumer mobility is not really observed. Only
market structure matters. These results clearly imply that the tax rate has to
be diﬀerently designed according to the market structure : in weakly urbanized
environments, the local monopolies are less taxed as they do not cover all the
market (cf. ﬁgure 3.1) Accordingly, optimal parking sizes have a peak at the
competitiveness point (cf. ﬁgure 3.2). Taxation is reduced so as not to shrink to
much the retailing areas of the ﬁrms. As a result, optimal tax rate does not vary
monotonically with consumer mobility and, consequently, with the competitiveness
of the economy.
13opti mal  parki ng si ze
t
Figure 3.2:
3.2.2. High urbanization θ ≥ 3N/4g
In high urbanized environments, the optimal tax is equal to gN/2, for any value
of t,i.e. for any market structure prevailing in the retailing sector. The unit
social cost is too high to sustain a diﬀerentiated tax treatment between duopoly,
exclusive territories retailers and local monopolies. As a result, the parking sizes
are equal to zero. Optimal taxation amounts to eliminate all the the social cost
generated by the retailers and tax rate is independent on the market structure.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the possibility to regulate retailing industry through
at a xo nt h es t o r ep a r k i n g . T h ea r g u m e n ts u p p o r t i n gt h i si d e ai st h a tr e t a i l e r s
in modern economies use common resources contributing to the accessibility they
do not pay for. These resources are especially scarce in highly urbanized areas.
This gives gross merchandisers and hypermakets a competitive advantage which
establishes undue market power while creating, presumably, ineﬃciencies when
social cost is taken into account. We presented a formal treatment of this argument
; by using a standard model of horizontal diﬀerentiation, we explored the impact
of taxation in a monopoly and in duopoly and we characterized optimal taxation
policies. Some extensions can le mentioned : in the model, the social cost is
assumed to be a linear while, in the real world, a convex form could better ﬁtt h e
environmental impact of retailing industry. Similarly, taxation is also assumed to
be linear ; using a non linear scheme could incite the retailers to share parking
resources, as they do in shopping centers. Finally, we have to keep in mind that
retailing industry face economies of scale which explain the gigantism tendency
observed in this sector. The question is to to know whether these economies of
14scale could come from free-rider behaviors on neglected public resources.This is a
crucial issue for regulation.
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Appendix 1: Lindhal prices and taxation
Lindhal prices are used to determine public good taxation. The parking size
can be considered as a public good. In section 2, we deﬁned :
• the proﬁto ft h er e t a i l e r , ˜ P (a),
• the consumer surplus, ˜ S(a),
• the social cost, θa.
The socially optimal parking size is a∗∗ =a r g m a x
h









15This ”allocation” of the public good can be achieved in a decentralized way, when
the retailer and the consumer face public good prices m1 and m2 ; independently,
both maximize their utilities deﬁned by
˜ Π(a1)= ˜ P (a1) − m1a1,
˜ Σ(a2)=˜ S (a2) − m2a2.
Of course, a∗∗ =a r gm a x˜ Π(a1)=a r gm a x˜ Σ(a2) if m1 = s∗∗ and m2 = θ − s∗∗.
Appendix 2 :Duopoly spatial competition under taxation
The duopolists have to choose the prices and the parking sizes for a given
tax rate s.L e t [0,u 1] and [u2,1] the market respectively served by ﬁrm 1 and
2, so that D1 = Nu1,D 2 = N(1 − u2). The switching point is ˆ u such that
v + ga1 − p1 − tu = v + ga2 − p2 − t(1 − u), namely :
ˆ u =
p2 − p1 − g(a1 − a2)+t
2t
. (.1)
For the sake of symmetry, we will only consider the situation of ﬁrm 1. Clearly,
the following conditions have to be fulﬁlled :(i) the consumer of ﬁrm 1 located
at u1 must lie at the left-hand side of the switching point ; (ii) he has to get a
positive surplus from buying to ﬁrm 1, hence the conditions :
u1 ≤ (p2 − p1 + g(a1 − a2)+t)/2t, (.2)
u1 ≤ (v + ga1 − p1)/t. (.3)
Then duopolist 1 faces the following optimization program
max
p1,a1,u1
N (p1 − c)u1 − αa2
1/2 − sa1
u1 ≤ (p2 − p1 + g(a1 − a2)+t)/2t
u1 ≤ (v + ga1 − p1)/t.
a1 ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian can be written as : L = N (p1 − c)u1 − αa2
1/2 − sa1 +
λ((p2 − p1 + g(a1 − a2)+t)/2t − u1)
+ξ ((v + ga1 − p1)/t − u1)+ηa1. Necessary optimality conditions can be writ-
ten ;
Nu1 − λ/2t − ξ/t =0 , (.4)
N (p1 − c) − λ − ξ =0 , (.5)
−αa1 − s + gλ/2t + gξ/t + η =0 . (.6)
16λ[(p2 − p1 + g(a1 − a2)+t)/2t − u1]=0 , (.7)
ξ [(v + ga1 − p1)/t − u1]=0 ,
ηa1 =0 .
λ ≥ 0,ξ ≥ 0,η ≥ 0. (.8)
Let us assume ﬁrstly that the tax rate is not too high, i.e. :
s ≤ Ng/2 (.9)
Using symmetry arguments, we consider that, at the equilibrium, p2 = p1,a 2 = a1.
Hence the following regimes can be distinguished :
• Regime (a) ξ =0 ,λ > 0,η =0 ,u 1 =1 /2,λ = N (p1 − c).Condition (.4)
gives N/2 − N (p1 − c)/2t − ξ/t =0 .Then p1 = p2 = t + c,a1 = a2 =
gN − 2s
2α
≥ 0 This regime is optimal if condition (.3) is satisﬁed, namely for








− t − c
¶
(.10)






































We have S1 = S2 = N
R 1/2
0 (v − p1 + ga1 − ty)dy = N
4vα − 5tα − 4cα +2 g2N − 4gs
8α
and Π1 = Π2 = 1
2Nt− 1
8 (gN − 2s)
Ng+2s
α . When s ≥ Ng/2,n e i t h e rﬁrm in-
vests in parking size. Four similar regimes are found with a1 = a2 =0,
where g and s are put to zero in the above formulas.
17• Regime (b ) ξ > 0,λ > 0,η =0 ,u 1 =1 /2. Multipliers ξand λ are solution
of system {(.4),(.5)}, namely ξ = N (c + t − p1),λ = N (2p1 − 2c − t).
Price p1is determined by relation 1/2=( v + ga1 − p1)/t,i.e. p1 = v − 1
2t +
ga1.Relation (.6) yields a1 = a2 =
gN−2s
2α and then p1 = p2 = v−t/2+g
gN−2s
2α .




α(2v − 3t − 2c)
g
<s≤ Ng/2+











α(2v − 3t − 2c)
g
≤ θ (.17)
We have S1 = S2 = N
R 1/2
0 (v − p1 + ga1 − ty)dy = Nt/8,and Π1 = Π2 =
(p1 − c)N/2 − αa2
1/2 − sa1 =
2Nα(2v−t−2c)+(2s−Ng)2
8α .
• Regime (c) ξ > 0,λ =0 ,η =0 . Variables ξ and u1 are solution of system
{(.4),(.5)}, namely ξ = N (p1 − c),u 1 =
p1−c




and, of course, a1 = a2 = a∗(s)=
Ng(v − c) − 2st
2αt − Ng2 , p1 = p2 = p∗(s). This
regime is optimal for
p1−c
t ≤ (v + ga1 − p1)/t , ξ > 0 and a1 ≥ 0. According






≥ s ≥ Ng/2+




We have S1 = S2 = S∗ (s)=1
2
Nt(αc − αv + gs)
2
(2αt − Ng2)
2 , Π1 = Π2 = Π∗(s)=
1
2
αN (v − c)
2 +2 s(st − Ng(v − c))
2αt − Ng2 .
• Regime (d) ξ > 0,λ =0 ,η > 0. We have a1 = a2 =0 ,p 1 = p2 =







We have S1 = S2 = S0 =
N(v−c)2
8t ,Π1 = Π2 = P0 =
N(v−c)2
4t .
18Appendix 3 : Optimal taxation
Let us consider successively the four regimes so as to determine the optimal
value of tax rate s ∈ [0,θ] which maximizes Ω = P1 + P2 + S1 + S2 − θ(a1 + a2).
• Regime(a).





α(2v − 3t − 2c)
g
(.21)
0 ≤ s ≤ θ, (.22)




4N (4v − 4c − t) is a linear function
of s with a coeﬃcient (2θ − gN) Then the solution si easy to found :
1. If θ ≤ Ng/2,the maximum is reached for s =0 . Hence a1 = a2 =
gN
2α,





— If t ≤ 2
h




/3,s= θ,a 1 = a2 =
gN−2θ
2α




In all the cases the price is c + t.
• Regime (b) :





α(2v − 3t − 2c)
g
<s ≤ Ng/2+
α(v − t − c)
g
(.24)



















−αt + αv − αc + θg
gα
:
2αv − 3αt − 2αc +2 θg
gα











cases have to be distinguished
— 0 ≤ Ng/2+1
2
α(2v−3t−2c)
g ⇔ t ≤ 2
£




/3,a n d θ ≤ Ng/2+
α(v−t−c)
g ⇔ t ≤ v − c +
g(gN−2θ)
2α
The candidates for the optimum is Ω(Ng/2+1
2
α(2v−3t−2c)
g ) and Ω(θ) :
Sraightforward computations prove that Ω(θ) S Ω(0) ⇔ θ S Ng/3.
Then the maximum welfare is reached (i) if θ ≤ Ng/3; for s =0and
a1 = a2 =
gN
2α, (ii) if not, for s = θ and a1 = a2 =
gN−2θ
2α .T h i sr e g i m e
is used for 2
£




/3 <t≤ v − c + g
gN
2α, if θ ≤ Ng/3), for
2
h








Each duopolist is in a local monopoly situation. Hence the tax rate is




4θ .This regime exists if θ ≤ 3
4gN.
v − c +
g(3Ng− 4θ)
4α









v − c +
g(3Ng− 4θ)
4α




, No solution found.
• Regime (d)
This regime holds with a1 = a2 =0;i ti st h e no p t i m a lf o ra n yv a l u eo ft h e
tax rate greater or equal to 2
3θ.
When θ ≤ 3
4gN, an intermediary regime b’ between regime b and c appears
for v − c +
g(gN−2θ)
2α ≤ t<v− c +
g(3Ng−4θ)
4α . Optimal tax rate is ﬁxed such
that t = v − c + g
(gN−2s)




g ,a 1 = a2 =
gN−2s
2α =: t−v+c






201. Regime a holds with s =m i n ( θ,gN/2)
2. For θ ≤ 3gN/4, regime b’ and c exist.
3. For θ ≥ 3gN/4,regime b’ and c do not exist, and a1 = a2 =0 ,for any value
of cost t.
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